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ABSTRACT
Modern processors utilize an increasingly large register set
to facilitate efficient floating point and SIMD computation.
This large register set is a burden for operating systems, as
its content needs to be saved and restored when the operating
system context switches between tasks. As an optimization,
the operating system can defer the context switch of the FPU
and SIMD register set until the first instruction is executed
that needs access to these registers. Meanwhile, the old
content is left in place with the hope that the current task
might not use these registers at all. This optimization is
commonly called lazy FPU context switching. To make it
possible, a processor offers the ability to toggle the availability
of instructions utilizing floating point and SIMD registers.
If the instructions are turned off, any attempt of executing
them will generate a fault.
In this paper, we present an attack that exploits lazy FPU
context switching and allows an adversary to recover the
FPU and SIMD register set of arbitrary processes or VMs.
The attack works on processors that transiently execute FPU
or SIMD instructions that follow an instruction generating
the fault indicating the first use of FPU or SIMD instructions.
On operating systems using lazy FPU context switching, the
FPU and SIMD register content of other processes or virtual
machines can then be reconstructed via cache side effects.
With SIMD registers not only being used for cryptographic
computation, but also increasingly for simple operations,
such as copying memory, we argue that lazy FPU context
switching is a dangerous optimization that needs to be turned
off in all operating systems, if there is a chance that they
run on affected processors.
INTRODUCTION
As demonstrated by the Meltdown attack [4], Intel proces-
sors speculatively execute instructions past the kernel/user
privilege check and the generation of a page fault. Together
with the related Spectre attack [3], these attacks were a
revelation that microarchitectural design decisions in pro-
cessors affect security properties of computing devices and
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sparked research into discovering further security-relevant
design issues in current general purpose CPU architectures.
In this paper, we introduce a new information leak vulner-
ability similar to Meltdown that affects popular operating
systems and hypervisors. We present practical attacks based
on this vulnerability leaking FPU register state across process
and virtual machine boundaries. In contrast to Meltdown,
we exploit the behavior of recent Intel processors when they
encounter a Device Not Available (#NM) exception instead
of a Page Fault (#PF) exception. This exception is used to
implement a context switch optimization called lazy FPU
context switching. We will demonstrate how speculative in-
struction execution can lead to full recovery of the FPU
register state of a victim process using unprivileged local
code execution in combination with this optimization.
The paper is structured as follows. We start with a back-
ground section that gives an overview over FPU state context
switching in operating systems and how the lazy FPU con-
text switching optimization works on Intel processors. We
will briefly revisit architectural details related to specula-
tive execution on out-of-order processors. Equipped with
this background knowledge, the following section builds the
LazyFP attack from a one-bit leak towards several practi-
cal attack variants. We will evaluate these variants. After
assessing the impact of this vulnerability to Intel AES-NI
and discussing mitigation, we review related work and finally
conclude.
BACKGROUND
In this section, we give relevant technical background that is
necessary to understand the LazyFP vulnerability.
The x87 FPU
The x87 floating-point unit (FPU) is a processor extension
with the original purpose of accelerating mathematical op-
erations on floating-point numbers. It has its own set of
instructions and registers. It is an integral part of every Intel
x86 microprocessor since the Intel 486DX introduced in 1989.
Up to the Intel 486DX, it used to be an optional external
co-processor.
Saving and restoring the FPU state to and from memory,
which is required to implement multitasking, was costly at
that time because memory was slow and limited. Addition-
ally, at that time usually only few applications actually used
the FPU. Switching FPU states on every context switch,
although the FPU is not used by all processes imposes unnec-
essary overhead. In order to be able to reduce this overhead,
a control register bit (cr0.ts) was introduced that allowed
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the operating system to switch the FPU on and off. While
the FPU is turned off, it keeps its state, but is inaccessible
to both user and kernel code.
The optimization made possible by cr0.ts is called lazy FPU
context switching. The core idea is that FPU register state
is only context switched when necessary and left in-place for
processes that do not use the FPU. This way, the operating
system avoids the cost of saving and restoring FPU context
where possible.
The operating system tracks which process the current FPU
register state belongs to. This process is called the FPU
owner. Additionally, the FPU may be enabled or disabled.
The simplest case is when the FPU is enabled. Here, the
current process is the FPU owner and can freely execute
FPU instructions. When the operating system switches to
another process, the FPU is disabled. It stays disabled until
a process attempts to execute an FPU instruction. As the
FPU is disabled, the processor generates an #NM exception.
What happens in response to the #NM depends on whether the
current process is the FPU owner. If it is, the FPU register
state belongs to this process and the operating system simply
enables the FPU. The process is again free to execute FPU
instructions.
If the current process when receiving the #NM exception is
not the FPU owner, the operating system enables the FPU,
stores the current FPU register state to the save area for
the FPU owner and restores the FPU register state of the
current process. As the FPU register state now matches the
running process, this process is now the FPU owner.
Variations on the above algorithm are possible, but all of
them share the property that the operating system does
not have to context switch the FPU register state when it
switches from an FPU-using process to a process that does
not use the FPU and back.
While lazy FPU context switching is still widely used in many
operating systems today, its underlying assumption is usually
not true anymore. Starting with the Intel MMX instruction
set extension and continuing with SSE, AVX, and AVX-512,
the FPU register state has been extended with ever larger
SIMD registers. The SSE instruction set is mandatory for 64-
bit x86 processors and practically all programs and libraries
use it for various tasks that would be inefficient without it,
such as copying memory.
Even though the larger FPU register state makes it theoreti-
cally more attractive to avoid costly FPU context switches, in
the current software landscape, every process will eventually
touch FPU registers and cause a costly #NM exception. For
this reason, at least the Linux kernel has switched to eager
FPU context switching by default, where FPU registers are
switched as part of the normal context switch and no #NM
exception is generated in normal operation.
FPU Handling in Virtualized Systems
A complete description of virtualization is out of scope for
this paper. For the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to
understand that with Intel VT the processor does not take
care of switching FPU register state when transitioning from
guest mode to the hypervisor. This leaves the hypervisor
in charge of context switching FPU register state and the
mechanisms are the same as for a non-virtualized operat-
ing system. As such, lazy FPU context switching is also
applicable to hypervisors.
Speculative Execution
Speculative execution is a technique used by modern micro-
processors aimed at increasing the utilization of the processor
pipeline. The processor executes instructions ahead of time,
but prevents their results, such as register updates and mem-
ory writes, from becoming architecturally visible until it was
veryfied that they are indeed supposed to be executed.
During this speculative execution, the processor has incom-
plete information. For example, it has to predict the direction
of conditional or indirect jumps. It can also assume that
certain instructions do not generate exceptions. If these
“guesses” turn out to be correct once the relevant information
is available, the results can be committed to the architectural
state and the respective instruction retires. If an assumption
was invalid, the processor discards all results from its mis-
speculation and resumes execution from the last correctly
executed instruction.
Instructions that execute, but their architectural side-effects
are discarded, are called transient instructions. However,
these instructions can change microarchitectural state. Mi-
croarchitectural state is not part of the processor’s instruction
set architecture. An example of microarchitectural state is
the content of caches.
For an in-depth discussion of speculative execution and how
microarchitectural state can be converted into architectural
state, we refer the reader to the Meltdown paper [4].
Intel TSX
Intel Transactional Synchronization eXtensions (TSX) is the
product name for two x86 instruction set extensions, called
Hardware Lock Elision (HLE) and Restricted Transactional
Memory (RTM). HLE is a set of prefixes that can be added to
specific instructions. These prefixes are backward-compatible
so that code that uses them also works on older hardware.
RTM is an extension adding several instructions to the in-
struction set that are used to declare regions of code that
should execute as part of a hardware transactions. Trans-
actions can protect a series of memory accesses that shall
either all succeed together or shall be rolled back together
in case of any error condition or concurrent access by other
threads.
A RTM transaction comprises the region of code that is en-
capsulated between a pair of xbegin and xend instructions.
xbegin also provides a mechanism to define an fall-back han-
dler that is called if the transaction is aborted. xabort can be
used by the executing code to explicitly abort the transaction.
In addition to that, the processor might abort the transaction
upon certain events. These events include, among others, an
exception that occurs during the transaction.
When we refer to Intel TSX in this paper, we refer to RTM
specifically.
LEAKING FPU REGISTERS
In this section, we will build several closely related exploits,
starting with a simple one-bit leak of an FPU register and
extending it towards leaking the complete FPU register set.
In the following discussion, we assume that there is a vic-
tim and an attacker process. The victim process contains
confidential information in its FPU register set, such as
cryptographic keys. The attacker process needs no special
permissions beyond the ability to execute arbitrary user code
on the same processor core (hardware thread) as the victim.
Mechanisms that achieve co-location are out of scope for
this paper, but in the simplest case random chance helps
with this requirement. Also typical operating systems do
not regard the ability to pin threads to cores as a privileged
operation.
The One-Bit Leak
A simple x86 assembly program for a one-bit leak is shown
in Figure 1. It reads the lower-half of the SSE registers xmm0
into the rax general purpose register. It then masks the
lowest bit and shifts it by 6 to be either 0 or 64 depending
on the input value. This calculated offset is used to write
to memory. On a system with 64-byte cache lines, the write
operation will touch one of two cache lines depending on bit
0 of the xmm0 register.
1 movq rax , xmm0
2 and rax , 1
3 shl rax , 6
4 mov dword [mem + rax], 0
Figure 1: The basic building block of the LazyFP
attack. The FPU register access executes specula-
tively with the previous process’ FPU register set.
The execution is retried once the operating system
kernel handles the #NM exception generated by the
first instruction.
Assuming the FPU registers being owned by the victim pro-
cess due to lazy FPU context switching, the movq instruction
generates a #NM fault to indicate to the operating system that
the FPU is disabled. The operating system will transparently
handle this fault, restore the register state of the current
process and continue execution.
The interesting part happens before the processor retires the
movq and generates the #NM fault. It has already executed
the subsequent instructions speculatively. The architectural
changes caused by these instructions is discarded, but their
microarchitectural footprint in the cache is not.
We thus get a speculative execution of the code with the
victim’s FPU register set and the regular execution with
the attacker’s register set. Assuming that the attacker set
xmm0 to zero and flushed mem + 64 from the processor cache,
he can now recover the victim’s bit by probing the access
latency of this memory location.
While this attack can be repeated to leak arbitrary bits from
arbitrary registers, in this simple form it is not practical.
Each attempt at leaking needs to be preceded by letting the
victim run. This is necessary to move ownership of the FPU
back to the victim, but it also means the victim will likely
change its register content rendering the results hard to use.
Leaking the Complete Register Set
To leak a consistent snapshot of the FPU register set of the
victim without the victim getting a chance to change the
state, the attacker needs a way to suppress the generation of
the #NM exception.
One idea is to suppress the #NM exception by deliberately
triggering another exception that the attacker can handle
before reading from the FPU registers.
In Figure 2, we show a variant of the exploit that causes a
page fault before the instruction touching the FPU register
state is executed. To recover from the page fault exception
1 mov dword [0], 0 ; causes #PF
2 movq rax , xmm0
3 and rax , 1
4 shl rax , 6
5 mov dword [mem + rax], 0
Figure 2: The FPU register access in the shadow of
a page fault. Subsequent instructions will execute
speculatively and their results are discarded when
the faulting instruction retires.
instead of being aborted by the operating system, the attacker
needs to configure a signal handler beforehand.
The attack still proceeds as described earlier with the crucial
difference that the instruction touching FPU state is executed
only speculatively. As such, the exception it causes is never
generated. Instead, the attacker receives a signal that he
can handle and continue. The operating system does not see
the #NM exception and will not replace the victim’s FPU
register state from the hardware registers. This leaves the
FPU register state untouched and the attack can continue
by probing further bits.
A downside to this approach is that it puts signal handling
in the path between probing the victim’s FPU registers and
being able to observe the cache effects. This introduces noise
as the cache line that was pulled in by speculative execution
may be evicted during signal handling.
Suppressing Exceptions using Intel TSX
The exception suppression using a page fault works, but it is
heavy-weight. For each leaking attempt, a signal is generated
by the kernel that needs to be handled. As we will see in
the evaluation, this slowness reduces the practicality of the
attack. Using a more light-weight way of suppressing the #NM
exception is therefore desirable. In recent TSX-capable Intel
CPUs, the Restricted Transactional Memory instruction set
extension is useful to achieve exactly that. RTM transactions
abort when exceptions are encountered during transactional
execution.
1 xbegin abort
2 movq rax , xmm0
3 and rax , 1
4 shl rax , 6
5 mov dword [mem + rax], 0
6 xabort
7 abort:
Figure 3: The FPU register access is executed inside
of a TSX transaction. The transaction will abort
once the #NM exception is generated, but subse-
quent instructions have already executed specula-
tively.
By executing the same simple attack as shown before, but
inside a TSX hardware transaction, the attacker can thus leak
one bit without triggering the operating system’s handling
of any exception. Example code is shown in Figure 3.
Suppressing Exceptions using Retpoline
Intel TSX is a relatively recent addition (Haswell and on-
wards) to the Intel x86 instruction set. This way it limits the
applicability of the attack to recent processors. It is possible
to achieve similar exception suppression using the retpoline
[5] construct.
1 call set_up_target
2 capture:
3 pause
4 jmp capture
5 set_up_target:
6 mov [rsp], destination
7 ret
Figure 4: The Retpoline construct that is used
to prevent the CPU to speculate past an indirect
branch. The CPU will always mispredict the target
of the ‘RET‘ instruction and speculatively execute
the capture loop.
Retpoline is initially meant as Spectre mitigation. The
original Retpoline construct is given in Figure 4. We refer
to the original publication [5] for details, but the idea is to
capture speculative execution in the pause loop (line 3 and
4) until the CPU notices the misprediction, discards any
speculatively executed instructions, and continues execution
at the desired jump destination.
The misprediction is constructed by exploiting the processor’s
reliance on the return stack buffer (RSB) for predicting
the target of a ret instruction. When executing a call
instruction, the processor pushes the return address both
onto the architectural stack in memory and onto the RSB.
On a subsequent ret, the processor can pop a value from
the RSB to predict the return target, while retrieving the
actual return address from memory lazily. Retpoline creates
a mismatch between these two values by modifying the return
address on the stack in memory. Speculative execution after
ret follows the address from the RSB. Once the processor
has fetched the actual return value from memory, it will
notice the misprediction, discard any results and continue
execution at the address fetched from memory.
1 call set_up_target
2 movq rax , xmm0
3 and rax , 1
4 shl rax , 6
5 mov dword [mem + rax], 0
6 capture:
7 pause
8 jmp capture
9 set_up_target:
10 mov [rsp], destination
11 ret
12 destination:
13 ; cache line access
14 ; latency probing code...
Figure 5: Using the Retpoline construct to specula-
tively execute the FPU register access in a reliable
way.
Using a technique described by Wong [6], we can repurpose
Retpoline for exception suppression. The example code is
shown in Figure 5.
If we prepend the capture loop in the Retpoline construct
with the FPU register access, the instructions we insert will
Method Cycles Eff. Throughput
Page fault 359.9K 0.22 MiB/s
Intel TSX 25.4K 3.12 MiB/s
Retpoline 24.0K 3.30 MiB/s
Table 1: The cycle count required to leak a single
256-bit AVX register with different exception sup-
pression methods.
only be executed speculatively. The pause loop is not re-
moved entirely because it keeps the processor from continuing
speculative execution into the following cache line access la-
tency probing code, which would tamper with the results.
Any exception that occurs in the speculative execution path
is never delivered. The result is comparable to the Intel TSX
variant, but applicable to older processors without support
for TSX and also, as shown in the Evaluation, slightly faster.
EVALUATION
The practicality of a LazyFP attack depends on the time it
takes to leak data from the FPU register set. The more time
the attacker needs to leak individual bits, the more likely it
is that the operating system preempts the attacker and the
victim gets a chance to continue executing. At that point,
the content of the FPU register set changes.
We thus evaluate the different variants of the attack intro-
duced in the previous chapter by comparing the time it takes
to leak a single AVX register (256 bits of data). One AVX
register is enough to leak an Intel AES-NI cipher key.
We perform our evaluation on an Intel Core i7-5600U CPU
running at 2.60 GHz using FreeBSD 11.1. Victim and at-
tacker processes are pinned to the same logical CPU.
In Table 1, we see that the page fault method is by far the
slowest of the three variants. To leak a single AVX register,
it takes more than 300000 cycles, or 138 µs. This inefficiency
is problematic, because the typical time slice length in a
modern operating system is as low as 1 ms. This duration
is not enough to leak the complete register file of 16 AVX
registers. Larger FPU register sets, such as those introduced
with AVX-512, are even farther out of reach.
While leaking individual registers can still be practical, the
efficiency can be increased by an order of magnitude by using
Intel TSX or Retpoline as exception suppression methods.
Both of these variants are able to leak a complete snapshot
of the FPU register state in a single scheduling time slice,
even for large register files, such as AVX-512.
The attack variants presented in this paper leak one bit per
execution attempt. These can be extended in a straight-
forward way to leak multiple bits per execution attempt.
Leaking 4 bits per attempt instantly quadruples the effective
throughput of the side-channel.
IMPACT ON AES-NI
While leaking FPU register state seems not as readily useful
to an adversary compared to reading arbitrary memory as in
the Meltdown attack, the impact on confidential information
can be equally devastating.
A full discussion of the affected processors, operating systems
and cryptographic libraries is out of scope for this paper.
For this information, we refer the reader to the Intel security
advisory INTEL-SA-00145. We would still like to give an
impact assessment for Intel AES-NI.
The Intel AES-NI instruction set extension [1] that is used
to provide hardware acceleration for AES encryption and
decryption is a prime target for a LazyFP-based attack.
AES-NI was introduced by Intel in 2010 with the Westmere
microarchitecture and is widely used for efficient AES imple-
mentation.
1 ; the data block is in xmm15.
2 ; xmm0 -xmm10 hold the round keys
3 pxor xmm15 , xmm0
4 aesenc xmm15 , xmm1 ; Round 1
5 aesenc xmm15 , xmm2 ; Round 2
6 aesenc xmm15 , xmm3 ; Round 3
7 aesenc xmm15 , xmm4 ; Round 4
8 aesenc xmm15 , xmm5 ; Round 5
9 aesenc xmm15 , xmm6 ; Round 6
10 aesenc xmm15 , xmm7 ; Round 7
11 aesenc xmm15 , xmm8 ; Round 8
12 aesenc xmm15 , xmm9 ; Round 9
13 aesenclast xmm15 , xmm10 ; Round 10
14 ; xmm15 holds the encryption result
Figure 6: The example AES-128 decryption se-
quence as it is given in the AES-NI documentation.
All round keys are kept in SSE registers and are
thus within reach of the LazyFP attack.
Figure 6 shows the AES-128 decryption code, as it is found
in the official Intel documentation. All round keys that are
required to decrypt the particular data block are kept in
SSE registers. SSE registers are part of the FPU register set
and thus the LazyFP vulnerability puts these into reach of
an adversary with the ability to execute code on the same
system, regardless of privileges.
The AES-NI documentation has further examples of AES-
NI accelerated AES encryption and key expansion, which
all keep key material in SSE registers. This is particularly
troublesome as the key expansion example keeps the original
cipher key in an SSE register for an extended period of time.
We conclude that AES-NI, especially if it is used as the Intel
documentation suggests, cannot provide confidentiality on a
system that is affected by the LazyFP vulnerability.
The susceptibility of AES-NI to the LazyFP side-channel is
ironic, as it is designed to defend against earlier timing and
cache-based side-channels. This also means that not using
AES-NI on affected systems is not an effective mitigation, as
it re-enables these earlier attacks.
MITIGATION
A long term solution is to abandon the idea of lazy FPU
context switching and switch context eagerly instead. For
the majority of operating systems that do not make such
functionality configurable, this change from lazy to eager
context switching can only be implemented by the operating
system vendor.
For operating systems that do have configurable FPU context
switching, an effective mitigation is to manually switch to
eager context switching. When running an affected Linux
kernel version newer than Linux 3.7, this can be achieved by
adding “eagerfpu=on” to the Linux kernel boot parameters.
RELATEDWORK
Our paper touches on the areas of processor microarchitec-
tural vulnerabilities and operating system design.
Meltdown [4] and Spectre [3] are the original classes of vul-
nerabilities that introduced the concept of exploiting mi-
croarchitectural state to read sensitive memory locations.
Our paper extends this work by adding the ability to read
sensitive information from the FPU register set.
The Flush+Reload technique [7] is a key building block to
translate microarchitectural state into architectural state and
thus make the above vulnerabilities and the one described
in this paper possible.
Jang et al. [2] demonstrate a practical timing channel using
Intel TSX. The timing channel is based on timing behavior
of TSX aborts due to page faults. We leverage this insight
and utilize the ability of TSX to mask arbitrary exceptions
from the operating system.
Retpoline [5] is a mitigation for Spectre attacks and is based
on the idea that is possible to reliably create branch mis-
predictions. We use a Retpoline-inspired technique as a
high-performance exception suppression and speculative exe-
cution steering method.
CONCLUSION
We have shown that speculative execution can be used to
leak architecturally inaccessible register state on Intel x86
processors using the example of the FPU register set. This
register set includes SIMD registers that are widely used for
cryptographic purposes. As an example, we have argued
how AES-NI, a popular AES-accelerating instruction set
extension, is significantly weakened when it is executed on a
system vulnerable to LazyFP.
We consider this result as another point in the argument
that microarchitectural design of processors has profound
implications for the security of system software and the
isolation properties of a system.
While short-term mitigations can work around the specific
issue presented in this paper and there are band-aids for
similar issues, we believe that a fundamental shift needs to
happen in they way processors are designed. Security needs
to take a front row seat.
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